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Fundamentalist Christian Educators v.
State: An Inevitable Compromise

Neal Devins*

The war between state regulators and religious parents and educators persists. The main battlefield is state regulations governing
the education of children at home and in private schools.
On one side, religious parents and educators claim that state-prescribed "minimum standards" and licensing procedures improperly
interfere with their religious beliefs. This claim is rooted in the
right to religious expression guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment 1 and the implied Fourteenth Amendment
right of parents to direct their children's upbringing. 2 Over the past
twenty years, this challenge to state authority has been championed
principally by Fundamentalist Christian educators 3 and parents.4

* Associate Professor of Law, Lecturer in Government, College of William and
Mary. The Author would like to thank Peter Dutton for exceptional research assistance.
1. U.S. CoNST. amend. I.
2. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); see U.S. CoNST. amend

XIV.

3. "Fundamentalist Christian educators" refers to evangelical Protestants and their
churches. These churches typically are not affiliated with mainstream Protestant denominations. See James C. Carper, The Christian Day School, in RELIGIOUS ScHOOLING IN
AMERICA 115-18 (James C. Carper & Thomas C. Hunt eds., 1984).
4. See generally James C. Carper & Neal E. Devins, The State and the Christian Day
School, in RELIGION AND THE STATE: EssAYS IN HoNOR OF LEO PFEFFER 211 (James E.
Wood, Jr. ed., 1985) (exploring the controversy between a state's right to impose reasonable regulations on religious schools and the Fundamentalist Christian day schools'
constitutional right to be free from unwanted state regulation); Neal Devins, A Constitutional Right to Home Instruction?, 62 WASH. U. L.Q 435 (1984) (defining the states' boundaries regarding regulation of home education and arguing that although the state may
regulate home education, it cannot prohibit it altogether); Patricia M. Lines, Private Education Alternatives and State Regulation, 12 J.L. & Enuc. 189 (1983) (discussing the home
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On the other side, state authorities emphasize their right to impose "reasonable" regulations on religious schools and religious
home instruction. State officials assert that these regulations establish minimum criteria to protect children from the adverse consequences of an inadequate education. The state, moreover, claims an
independent interest in assisting the child in developing citizenship
skills. Schools and parents who do not conform to these regulations
violate compulsory school attendance laws and may be subject to
criminal prosecution.
From 1975 to 1983, Fundamentalist Christian educators and parents fought a holy war against state officials. Neither side seemed
especially interested in accommodating the other and, as a result,
lawsuits emerged in most states. Sometimes religious liberty claimants would succeed; most times the state would prevail. But these
state victories came at a substantial price. Unwilling to comply with
court-approved regulations, religious parents and ministers were
jailed, churches were padlocked, and states threatened to terminate
parental rights. 5
Since 1983, this struggle, though far from dormant, has become
subdued. Each side seems more accepting of the other. More significantly, the battle has shifted away from adversarial winner-takeall litigation towards legislative reform. Since 1982, thirty-four
states have adopted home school statutes or regulations. 6 Twentythree of these states, moreover, have repealed teacher certification
requirements; only one state-Michigan-still demands that all
pupils be taught by a certified teacher. 7
education movement and examining the constitutional implications of state regulation);
Ira C. Lupu, Home Education, Religious Liberty, and the Separation of Powers, 67 B.U. L. REv.
971 (1987) (examining the constitutional implications of state regulation ofhome education and arguing that for constitutional and other reasons, home education should be
discouraged); Cynthia W. West, Comment, The State and Sectarian Education: Regulation to
Deregulation, 1980 DuKE LJ. 801 (examining the constitutional boundaries within which a
state may regulate religious schools and discussing the constitutional and policy implications oflegislative deregulation of religious schools).
5. See Neal Devins, Nebraska and the Future of State Regulation of Christian Schools, in
GoVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, II, at 107 (Dean M. Kelly ed., 1986);
David Moshman, Faith Christian v. Nebraska: Parent, Child, and Community Rights in the
Education Arena, 86 TCHRS. C. REc. 553 (1985) (discussing the situation surrounding the
Faith Christian School).
6. Christopher J. Klicka, Home Schooling in the United States: A Statutory Analysis (Aug. 1990) (on file with Author); see also Donald P. Dorman, Note, Michigan :s- Teacher
Certification Requirement as Applied to Religiously Motivated Home Schools, 23 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 733, 746-54 (1990) (arguing that a Michigan statute requiring teacher certification
for parental home instructors is unconstitutional); HoME ScH. CT. REP., May:June 1991,
at 8.
7. In 1983, 24 states demanded that home schools be taught by a certified teacher.
See Lines, supra note 4, at 227-34. Today, Michigan is the only state that has a teacher
certification requirement. See HoME ScH. CT. REP., july-Aug. 1991, at I; infra notes 96100 and accompanying text.
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This Essay will examine the transformation of controversies between Fundamentalist Christian educators and state education officials from court confrontations to political compromise. In
examining this shifting landscape, three points will be made. First,
litigation is ill-suited to resolve this conflict. The differences between Fundamentalist Christian educators and state officials become
more pronounced during litigation, even though both sides share
significant common ground. 8 Court rulings rarely recognize this
common ground; instead, courts seem predisposed either to approve or to invalidate all regulations. Making matters worse, judgments are difficult to enforce because the termination of parental
rights and other sanctions for noncompliance are too severe to put
into effect. Second, the Supreme Court's free-exercise decisions
play a rather small role in this field. The state political process, on
the other hand, is as a matter of political necessity extraordinarily
sensitive to religious liberty concerns. The jailing of dedicated parents and religious officials does not sit well with the electorate, especially when children in Fundamentalist Christian schools and home
study programs outperform their public school counterparts.
Third, political compromise should not be equated with political abdication. Important state objectives are best served through cooperative measures. State officials, therefore, should not shy away
from insisting that in critical areas these Fundamentalist Christian
school and home study students measure up to public school
standards.

I.

The Failure

of the Adversarial Model

The legal battle between state regulators and religious parents
and educators apparently pits intractable foes in a fight to the death.
Religious interests, it seems, reject any state involvement in their educational ministries. 9 State actors seem likewise unyielding in their
demand that religious educators mimic their public school counterparts.10 When one examines the legal arguments and rhetorical
posturing that surrounds their court battles, however, this caricaturing becomes understandable.
A.

The Interests of the Adversaries

The source of the confrontation is widespread dissatisfaction
among Fundamentalist Christian parents and educators with the
state educational establishment. The main reason these Fundamentalist Christian parents opt out of public schools is their perception
8. Cf Lupu, supra note 4, at 987 (noting that Christian parents are unwilling to
"submit to a jurisdiction whose very exercise they find constitutionally-and religiously--objectionable'').
9. See id.; Tom Minnery, Does David Gibbs Practice Law as Well as He Preaches ChurchState Separation?, CHRISTIANITY ToDAY, Apr. 10, 1981, at 48.
10. See STEPHEN ARONS, COMPELLING BELIEF 100-01, 121-22 (1983) (cataloging criticisms of the values public schooling furthers and ideological justifications given in defense of public education).
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that the "secularization" of public schools, (attributed to Supreme
Court decisions prohibiting organized prayer, 11 Bible reading, 12 the
teaching of Biblical creation, 13 and the posting of the Ten Com~
mandments 14 in public schools) denies their right to oversee the up~
bringing of their children as they see fit. Many Fundamentalist
Christian educators also complain of the perceived "breakdown" in
public education, associated with lack of discipline, sexual permis~
siveness, and drug and alcohol abuse. 15 In court, Fundamentalist
Christians attack state regulations as being anti~religious and having
a poor educational policy. They depict the state education bureau~
cracy as either insensitive or hostile to the religious mission of these
Fundamentalist Christian educators. Unlike Catholic, Jewish, and
other religious educators who often embrace teacher certification
requirements and other state regulations, Fundamentalist Christian
educators and home study proponents have greater difficulty com~
plying with state regulations that seek to make private schools like
public schools. 16 Contending that many of these regulations serve
no useful educational purpose, Fundamentalist Christians deem
state regulatory initiatives as de facto religious harassment. To sup~
port their regulatory ineffectiveness contention, Fundamentalist
Christian educators and parents point to the fact that their students
generally perform as well or better than their public school counter~
parts on nationally recognized achievement tests. 17
Weighing against these arguments is the state's paramount inter~
est in the education of its youth. Education is one of the state's
most compelling responsibilities. The state's interest in education
was noted by the great education reformer Horace Mann, who said,
"The true business of the schoolroom connects itself, and becomes
11. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,436 (1962).
12. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963).
13. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968).
14. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980).
15. See Carper, supra note 3, at 115-18. These reasons typically are cited by nonChristian parents in explaining current dissatisfaction with public schools. See Thomas
Toch, The Exodus, U.S. NEws AND WORLD REP., Dec. 9, 1991, at 66-67. The number of
students who opt out for religious reasons is inexact. Most estimates suggest that
1,000,000 students attend Christian schools and 300,000 children are taught at homeabout 75% of whom are taught by Christian parents. See Carper, supra note 3; Toch,
supra, at 73.
16. See generally Carper, supra note 3; Devins, supra note 4; Lines, supra note 4.
17. See David Guterson, When Schools Fail Children, HARPER's, Nov. 1990, at 58, 59
(contending that home-schooled children tend to score well above average on standardized achievement tests); Alfie Kohn, Home Schooling, ATLANTIC, Apr. 1988, at 20, 21, 23
(citing numerous studies concluding that the great m<Jjority of home-schooled students
score above average on achievement tests); Brian D. Ray, The Kitchen Classroom, CHRISTIANITY ToDAY, Aug. 12, 1988, at 23-24 (reviewing the growing empirical data supporting
the theory that students taught at home score better on standardized tests than those
who attend public schools).
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identical, with the great interests of society." 18 In a similar vein, the
Supreme Court noted in Brown v. Board of Education:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and
the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society.... In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education. 19

Because of the centrality of the state's interest in ensuring the provision of good education to all youngsters, the state is vested with the
authority to establish reasonable regulations governing both public
and private schools. Not surprisingly, state education officials are
reluctant to subordinate their rulemaking authority and instincts20
to validate the deregulatory agenda of Fundamentalist Christian educators and parents.
B.

The Failure ofJudicial Balancing of Interests

Judicial attempts to resolve this dispute have been truly unsatisfactory. These cases often present courts with an apparently hopeless entanglement of fact, judgment, secular values, and religious
conviction. Consequently, court decisions on this issue are often at
odds with one another. Some courts approve while others invalidate identical regulatory schemes-all applying the "same" legal
standard. 21 There are also great variances within a state. State and
local education officials are inconsistent in their application of often
vague regulatory demands 22 and are selective in their enforcement
of the law. 23
The variability of judicial decisionmaking is apparent in competing judicial perceptions of teacher certification requirements.
Courts that rule for the state see themselves as "ill-equipped to act
as school boards and determine the need for discrete aspects of a
compulsory school education program," 24 and argue "that it goes
without saying that the State has a compelling interest in the quality
18. 2 THE ANNALS OF AMERICA: GREAT ISSUES IN AMERICAN LIFE 365 (1968) (quoting HORACE MANN, TWELTH ANNUAL REP. OF THE MASS. BD. OF EDUC. (1848)).
19. 347 u.s. 483, 493 (1954).
20. See Eugene Bardach, Educational Paperwork, in ScHOOL DAYS, RULE DAYS 124
(David L. Kirp & Donald N. Jensen eds., 1986); Robert A. Kagan, Regulating Business,
Regulating Schools: The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness, in ScHOOL DAYS, supra, at 64.
21. See generally Devins, supra note 4 (discussing the judicial rationales for validating
various states' regulatory procedures in the face of constitutional challenges); Lines,
supra note 4;James W. Tabak & Perry A. Zirkel, Home Instruction: An Analysis of the Statutes
and Case Law, 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 1 (1982) (surveying the means by which states maintain control over home schooling).
22. See Leah B. Ward, What Happens When Parents Tum Teachers, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 10,
1982, § 13, at 3 (comparing the disparate manners in which two Rhode Island families
were treated under that state's home instruction laws).
23. See infra notes 96-110 and accompanying text (discussing home school enforcement in Michigan).
24. State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883, 899-900 (N.D. 1980).
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and ability of those who [teach] its young people." 25 Courts that
side with religious interests appear equally presumptive. They find
it "difficult to imagine ... a state interest sufficiently substantial to
sanction abrogation of [the parent's] liberty to direct the education
of their children," 26 and, though seeing a bachelor's degree as an
"indicator" of competency, nonetheless find a bachelor's requirement excessive because "it is not a sine qua non the absence of
which establishes [incompetency]." 27
Vagaries injudicial approaches are a result of many factors. Poor
lawyering on the parts of some state prosecutors and attorneys for
Fundamentalist Christian educators offers a partial explanation for
this judicial failure. 28 Varying regulatory schemes are also at issue.
More significantly, Supreme Court decisions provide ample support
for each side. Parents and schools refer to language in Court rulings that the state cannot "standardize" children by "forcing them
to accept instruction from public teachers only," 29 that "[t]he child
is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations," 30 and that these
"additional obligations" include "the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship." 31 Attorneys for the state, in contrast, refer to Court opinions proclaiming
that parents "have no constitutional right to provide their children
with private school education unfettered by reasonable government
regulation," 32 and recognizing state power "to require that all children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of
good moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies
plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare." 3 3
Employment Division v. Smith 34 is not likely to clarify this muddle.
25. State v. Faith Baptist Church, 301 N.W.2d 571, 579 (Neb. 1981) (emphasis
added).
26. State v. Whisner, 351 N.E.2d 750, 771 (Ohio 1976) (emphasis added).
27. Kentucky State Bd. v. Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877, 884 (Ky. 1979), cert. denied, 446
u.s. 938 (1980).
28. See James C. Carper, The Whisner Decision: A Case Study in State Regulation of Christian Day Schools, 24 J. CHURCH & ST. 281 (1983) (implying that the prosecution did not
produce sufficient testimony to support its arguments); Minnery, supra note 9 (asserting
that a fundamentalist Ohio law firm has lost important cases because of a lack of time
and thoroughness by the firm's senior partner). On the importance of good lawyering,
see William Bentley Ball, 60 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 809 (1992).
29. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
30. /d.
31. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972).
32. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 178 (1976).
33. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534.
34. 494 u.s. 872 (1990).
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In holding that "the right to free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of
general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes),' " 35
Smith apparently limits free exercise protections to instances where
religious practice is singled out for differential treatment. Because
state regulations governing religious schools and parents extend to
nonsectarian schools and parents, Smith's holding presumably extends to government regulation of church-based education ministries. At the same time, Smith recognizes that when free exercise
claims operate "in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as ... the right of parents ... to direct the education of
their children, " 36 heightened judicial scrutiny may well be appropriate. Indeed, pointing to this language, attorneys for religious parents and educators contend that Smith ultimately buttresses religious
liberty claims against state education officials. Although this argument has yet to succeed, 37 Smith preserves an uneasy status quo of
self-contradictory decisionmaking.
Inconsistent rulings have proved especially destabilizing here.
Each side had reason to think that they might secure a complete
victory in courts, and thereby became more resolute in their position. Indeed, the absolutist positions stated in adversariallitigation
took hold and both sides became more extreme in their positions.
Fundamentalist Christian educators and parents increasingly came
to view their schools as God's property. At the urging of the Christian Law Association and other advocacy groups, 38 they repudiated
state regulatory authority as inconsistent with the New Testament
command to "render therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's." 39 The state also hardened its position. Rather than limit its regulatory authority, some
state officials preferred to close churches, and jail ministers and
parents. 40
The adversarial model has also failed because of the high costs of
enforcement. When the state loses in court, its regulatory scheme
is, of course, without effect. When the state wins in court, however,
it faces a dilemma. Religious educators and parents often profess
that they would rather go to jail than comply with regulatory demands that violate their religious beliefs. These are not empty
threats. In Nebraska and Michigan for example, religious parents
have been jailed for refusing to comply with teacher certification requirements.41 Tremendous pressure is placed on the state through
35. /d. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 (1982)).
36. /d. at 881 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)).
37. People v. Dejonge, 470 N.W.2d 433 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); Crites v. Smith, App.
No. 01-A-01-9101-CH-00002, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 721 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 4,
1991).
38. See Minnery, supra note 9, at 49.
39. Luke 20:25-26; Mark 12:17-18"; Matthew 22:21-22.
40. See Devins, supra note 5, at 107.
41. See id. at 112-15; Michigan: Home Schoolers Feel Pressure, HoME ScH. CT. REP. Mar.Apr. 1991, at 7-8).
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this steadfast resistance. Sanctions such as the padlocking of
churches, the jailing of ministers and parents, and the termination
of parental rights can be successful only if there is widespread public
support. But this support rarely emerges; for whatever wrong Fundamentalist Christian educators might be guilty of, it is a wrong that
does not justify such severe sanctions.
Disputes between the state and Fundamentalist Christian educators are ill-suited to judicial resolution. Indeed, resorts to legalism
have clearly had a deleterious effect. By discouraging an out-ofcourt constitutional dialogue between opposing sides, the issue was
thrust into an adversarial setting with each side shouting slogans at
the other. Worse yet, the conflict was prolonged by inconsistentjudicial approaches and generally successful disobedience to pro-state
decisions. Along the way, children were harmed. Their lives lacked
stability as their parents and the state engaged in open conflict over
their hearts and souls. Rather than cooperate to ensure that all children receive a quality education without unduly disrupting parental
rights, litigation chilled efforts to find a common ground. 42

II.

Politics as Religious Salvation

Fundamentalist Christian educators and parents often lose in
court. In almost all cases, however, religious interests ultimately
prevail. How can this be? The answer is that the success of these
Fundamentalist Christian educators is not contingent on favorable
court rulings. Although regulations may ask too much of private
schools and therefore be found unreasonable by courts,43 the state
most often suffers political defeats. 44 In the end, rather thanjailing
parents and ministers for noncompliance, state officials ultimately
back down from High Noon-style showdowns with Fundamentalist
Christian educators and parents. This is the lesson of North Carolina, Nebraska, Michigan, and several other states.
42. Litigation, on occasion, prompts political solutions. Consequently, although litigation, standing alone, is insufficient in fashioning appropriate policies, it may help
frame subsequent political debates. At the same time, were the state and Christian educators willing to engage in a nonadversarial dialogue, solutions to policy disputes would
be reached with less emotional, financial, and educational costs. In cases where
nonadversarial dispute resolution proves impossible, litigation cannot be abandoned
and may well serve a useful political purpose. For the reasons specified in this Section,
however, litigation should be disfavored by both the state and religious educators.
43. See, e.g., Kentucky State Bd. v. Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1979); State v.
Whisner, 351 N.E.2d 750 (Ohio 1976). For an analysis of these decisions, see ARONS,
supra note 10, at 157-85; Carper, supra note 28.
44. See Perry A. Zirkel, Home Schooling, 1991 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 408, 409 ("The tendency in recent years has been for the advocates of home schooling to win in the state
legislatures, while they have lost in the !=Ourts.").
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A.

North Carolina

The state political process in North Carolina has been extraordinarily sensitive to the religious liberty concerns of its citizens. On
two separate occasions, the state legislature enacted deregulation
measures in response to court rulings governing private religious
education. When a 1978 state trial court decision approved existing
curriculum and teacher certification requirements as "based upon
sound educational policy and logic,"45 the legislature, in 1979, reacted by specifically exempting church-affiliated schools from most
state oversight.46 The only obligations placed on religious schools
were to keep attendance and disease immunization records, 47 to
comply with building codes,48 and to administer a nationally standardized achievement test, to be selected by the school and with no
state-prescribed minimum score. 49 These minimal demands were
rooted in the belief that "in matters of education ... [n]o human
authority shall interfere with the rights of conscience or with religious liberty." 50 Indeed, the North Carolina legislature went so far
as to create a Division of Nonpublic Education to accommodate further religious liberty concerns.5 1
This legislative turn-around was a response to "[intense] pressure
from Fundamentalist Christian schools and fundamentalists." 52
Thousands of fundamentalists voiced support of reforms at hearings
at the state capitol and within a year the deregulation measure was
approved overwhelmingly. 53 This outcome is hardly surprising.
North Carolina is a "Bible belt" state with a large and vocal fundamentalist constituency, and the legislature's responsiveness to fundamentalist issues is due to this relative uniformity of a large
segment of the voting population. 54
The 1979 law, however, proved far from perfect for religious liberty concerns. Home instruction was not mentioned in the law and
the state's attorney general interpreted this omission to mean that
home schools were unauthorized. 55 The legislature "corrected"
45. State v. Columbus Christian Academy, No. 78 CVS 1678, slip op. at 14 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Sept. 1, 1978), vacated as moot (May 4, 1979).
46. 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 505. (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-547 to -554
(1991)).
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-548 (1991).
48. /d.
49. Id. §§ 115C-549 to -550.
50. Id. § 115C-547.
51. Telephone Interview with Tim Simmons, Education Reporter, RALEIGH NEWS
AND OBSERVER (Oct. 10, 1991) [hereinafter Simmons Interview].
52. David Perkins, Board Seeks Tighter Rein on Home Schools, RALEIGH NEws AND OBSERVER, Apr. 3, 1987, at 10, 20.
53. Bill Would Require Diploma for Parents Teaching at Home, RALEIGH NEws AND OBSERVER, june 17, 1988; Telephone Interview with Charles Nettles, Legislative Vice-President of North Carolinians for Home Education (Oct. 17, 1991) [hereinafter Nettles
Interview].
54. Simmons Interview, supra note 51.
55. 49 N.C. Att'y Gen. 8-9 (1979).

826

[VOL.

60:818

Devins
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

this interpretation in 1987, 56 in large part as a response to a decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court. 57 Only two minimal demands are placed on the content of home study programs by the
bill: home instructors must have a high school diploma or
equivalent, and home school students must take an annual achievement test. 58 The law does not require a showing of any particular
level of proficiency on the standardized achievement test; it requires
no showing of competency on the part of the teacher to teach; it
requires no health or safety inspections; and there are no curriculum or minimum attendance requirements, except to operate on a
"regular schedule" during at least nine calendar months. 59
Religious liberty interests, in pushing through this bill, demolished and demoralized the state education bureaucracy. The North
Carolina State Board of Education sought to require home study
parents to have graduated from college, to adhere to a five and one
half hour school day, to comply with expansive curriculum demands, and to demonstrate compliance with these guidelines to local boards of education. 60 Home schoolers countered these efforts
with their own reform package and a successful political strategy.
Key legislators, willing to promote the home schoolers' model bill,
were also identified. One such legislator was delegate Coy Privette,
who argued from two premises: first, that "the basic responsibility
for the education of children belongs to the parents," 61 and, second, that because the public schools in North Carolina "consistently
rank 48th or 49th in the nation on standardized tests, the public
school process has not in fact been serving the state interests."62
Therefore, he concluded, home educators could simply do a better
job than the education establishment of protecting public values. 63
Home schoolers backed up these arguments with a strong showing of support at legislative committee meetings. "Our tactic was to
show up at every committee meeting with three or four hundred
home educators .... We couldn't speak but they saw our interest
and support," said Charles Nettles of North Carolinians for Home
56. 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 891 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-563 (1991)); see
Perkins, supra note 52, at 10, 20; see also Devins, supra note 4, at 441; Edward K. Proctor
V, Comment, Delconte v. State: Some Thoughts on Home Education, 64 N.C. L. REv. 1302,
1314 (1986).
57. Delconte v. State, 329 S.E.2d 636 (N.C. 1985) (holding that parent's home
school instruction of children met statutory requirement for complying with compulsory
school attendance).
58. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-564 (1987).
59. Id. §§ 115C-564, -565.
60. See Perkins, supra note 52, at 10, 20.
61. Telephone Interview with Coy Privette, Delegate, North Carolina General Assembly (Oct. 17, 1991).
62. ld.
63. ld.
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Education. 64 "It all turned out so well, because we got so many
people to lobby in Raleigh. We wanted the legislators to see what
kind of people we really are. We try to do things the right way." 65
What made the greatest difference in getting legislation passed
was that home educators turned their position into a religious issue.
"During the legislative process, home schoolers originally took a
straightforward political approach," noted Tim Simmons of the Raleigh News and Observer. 66 "But this didn't take them anywhere. However, when the home schoolers added the religious angle, the
legislature backed off quickly."67 According to Simmons, "[i]t was
this emphasis on religion that became the pivotal issue, and the legislature simply wanted to avoid crossing swords with the Fundamentalists, so religion became the trump card that won the game for
home schoolers."6S
Religious liberty interests did more than prevail. Their bill was
approved ninety-three to zero in the state house; 69 the state board
proposal, in contrast, never made it out of the House Education
Committee. 70 The political power of Fundamentalist Christians
combined with the low national ranking of North Carolina public
education explains this lopsided victory.
B.

Nebraska71

The forces of reform manifested themselves quite differently in
Nebraska. The most controversial battle between the state and Fundamentalist Christian educators centers around ajanuary 1981 Nebraska Supreme Court decision, State v. Faith Baptist Church, 72
involving Pastor Everett Sileven's unaccredited Faith Christian
School. Mter a three-year struggle with the state, Pastor Silevenwho publicly prayed for God to kill state education officials 73proved the eventual victor. That the state ultimately backed down
suggests that the price of enforcing state regulatory schemes may be
too great to be practicable.
Events leading up to this widely publicized decision and its aftermath date back to 1977, when Faith Baptist Church of Louisville
opened a school without state approval. The leadership of the
church maintained that "the operation of the school is simply an
extension of the ministry of the church, over which the State of Nebraska has no authority to approve or accredit." Asserting that the
64. Nettles Interview, supra note 53.
65. /d.
66. Simmons Interview, supra note 51.
67. /d.
68. Telephone Interview with Tim Simmons, Education Reporter, RALEIGH NEws
AND OBSERVER (Oct. 17, 1991).
69. /d.
70. /d.
71. The following description of events in Nebraska is adapted from Devins, supra
note 5, at 112-15.
72. 301 N.W.2d 571 (Neb.), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 803 (1981).
73. World of Religion, WASH. PosT, Feb. 12, 1983, at B6; see DAVID MoSHMAN, CHILDREN, EDUCATION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 168 (1989).
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state had no "right to inspect God's property," Pastor Sileven and
the church officers refused to (1) provide a list of the students enrolled in the school, (2) seek approval for the educational program,
(3) employ certified teachers, and (4) seek approval to operate the
institution.
The state sought to enjoin the operation of the school because of
noncompliance with state regulations. A lower state court ruled in
favor of the state. The defendants then appealed to the Nebraska
Supreme Court, which focused its attention on the state's compelling interest in education. The court asserted that the state's requirements for teacher certification and curriculum approval were
minimal, testing could not protect the state's interest in education,
and the state had the power to impose " 'reasonable regulations for
the control and duration of basic education.' " 74 In rather terse language it concluded that:
The refusal of the defendants to comply with the compulsory education laws of the State of Nebraska as applied in this case is an
arbitrary and unreasonable attempt to thwart the legitimate, reasonable, and compelling interests of the State in carrying out its
educational obligations, under a claim of religious freedom. 75

The Faith Baptist decision, in Sileven's eyes, only meant that his
school could no longer lawfully operate in Nebraska. Instead,
Sileven operated the school both in an Iowa church and "underground" until he reopened the school at Faith Baptist Church. 76
Refusing to close the institution because of his religious convictions,
he was sentenced in February 1982 to four months in jail for contempt of court.77 Sileven was released thirteen days later after
promising Judge Raymond Case that he would keep the school
closed. Two weeks later, however, the school was reopened. 78 The
game of arrest and release was repeated four times until Sileven
eventually completed his four month term injanuary 1983. 79 In the
meantime, Sileven requested that the Nebraska legislature develop a
regulatory scheme acceptable to all parties concerned. A special
session ended November 13, without addressing the issue. 80
When Faith Christian School reopened in the fall of 1982 without
74. Faith Baptist, 301 N.W.2d at 577 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213
(1972)).
75. /d. at 580.
76. Fred Barbash, 'Monday Schools' Invoke Bible and Constitution Against State, WASH.
PosT, Nov. 27, 1981, at A6, A7.
77. Sileven v. Tesch, 326 N.W.2d 850, 851-52 (Neb. 1982) (affirming lower court's
order denying Sileven's request for release from incarceration).
78. Town and Pastor are Angered Foes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1982, § 1, Part I, at 38.
79. Minister Freed Again in School Cases, WASH. PosT, Feb. 1, 1983, at A4.
80. Nebraska Minister jailedfor Defying School Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1982, at A17; see
Nebraska Revises Hiring Rules for Church Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1984, § 1, Part I, at
21.
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state approval, Sileven was arrested and returned to jail to complete
the contempt-of-court sentence. To prevent continued operation of
the school, the state, in October 1982, padlocked the church on
weekdays. 81 This action precipitated a protest involving upwards of
five hundred people. 82 The school, however, continued to operate
under the supervision of Reverend Jim Lee. 83
Amid threats of prosecution, Faith Christian School and as many
as twenty-five other "nonapproved" institutions throughout Nebraska operated in 1983.84 Efforts at compromise during the fall of
1983 again failed, and in November, six fathers of Faith Christian
students werejailed-and remainedjailed until February 1984-for
refusing to answer a judge's questions concerning the school. 85
Their wives and children then fled the state to avoid prosecution.
The succeeding events in the saga of Faith Christian School
demonstrate the difficulty a state may have in enforcing its regulatory scheme against resistant Fundamentalist Christian educators.
This difficulty received national attention, and ultimately was the
subject of federal scrutiny. In early December 1983, the United
States Department ofjustice (DOJ) considered intervention.86 In a
similar vein, United States Secretary of Education T.H. Bell suggested that Nebraska's eligibility for federal education funds would
be jeopardized if evangelicals could show that state education officials were practicing religious discrimination in their attempts to
close the Faith Christian School.87
In addition to federal scrutiny, Nebraska became the subject of
national publicity, frequently negative, for its jailing of individuals
who acted on the basis of religious conscience. Injanuary 1984, for
example, Reverends jerry Falwell andjessejackson, on separate occasions, visited the Faith Christian School.
Possibly in response to this publicity and possibly just unwilling to
keep on jailing Fundamentalist Christian educators, Nebraska Governor Robert Kerrey established a four-member panel to examine
and report on the public policy questions surrounding the Christian
school issue. Onjanuary 26, 1984, the governor's panel issued its
report, concluding, among other things, that "[s]ome accommodation to the First Amendment freedom of religion claims of the Fundamentalist Christian school supporters must be recognized." 88
The panel thus recommended that standardized tests could be offered to students in place of teacher certification and curriculum requirements. Parents choosing that procedure would give the State a
81. Nebraska Baptist School Locked by Court Order, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1982, at A16.
82. Judith Miller, Fundamentalists Fight Nebraska over School, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22,
1982, at Al. The judge later suspended the padlock order to prevent potential violence.
83. Disputed School Opens, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1982, at B17.
84. Devins, supra note 5, at 113.
85. In re Contempt of Ralph Liles, 344 N.W.2d 626 (Neb. 1984).
86. Devins, supra note 5, at 113.
87. /d.
88. THE REPORT OF THE GovERNOR's CHRISTIAN ScHOOL IssuE PANEL 27 Uan. 26,
1984) [hereinafter NEBRASKA GOVERNOR'S REPORT] (copy on file with Author).
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written statement saying that their religious beliefs dictated their
choice and that they consented to testing.s9
The governor's panel claimed that its recommendations struck
"an appropriate balance between the legitimate interest of the State
in the education of Nebraska youth and religious freedom." 90 Yet,
when placed in the context of the Nebraska situation, the panel report appears to be no more than a political sellout. The panel ignored its state supreme court decision in State v. Faith Baptist
Church, 91 as well as its own finding that the state "clearly has an obligation to establish reasonable and effective educational standards
and to exercise an appropriate degree of control over all educational efforts." 92 The panel concluded that "Nebraska teacher certification procedures as presently defined violate the First
Amendment free exercise of religious rights of Christian schools." 93
The state legislature acted on the panel's recommendations and
enacted legislation in April 1984.94 The new law does not require
schools to provide any information to state officials. Instead, parents who elect to send their children to a school that does not apply
for state approval must provide the state with information about the
education their children are receiving. Specifically, parents who find
existing state regulations in conflict with their religious beliefs can
satisfy state compulsory-education laws by submitting an "information statement" that declares that their children attend school for
175 days a year and that they are instructed in core curriculum
subjects.95
It is noteworthy that the state legislature had earlier failed on several occasions to enact similar measures. Why this change in attitude? One possibility is that the Faith Baptist situation raised the
legislators' religious conscience. This possibility, however, does not
explain the earlier resistance to similar legislative proposals-including proposals made when Pastor Sileven was in jail and the
Faith Baptist Church was padlocked. A second possibility is that the
legislators viewed the current state of affairs as a no-win situation.
National attention, the jailing of ministers and parents, and possible
child custody proceedings certainly would make such a response
plausible. A final possibility, as suggested by several state legislators, is that the governor made an agreement with the Nebraska
State Education Association to support its educational reform proposal introduced in the previous session in exchange for a promise
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
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Id. at 22.
Id. at 1.
301 N.W.2d 571 (Neb.), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 803 (1981).
NEBRASKA GovERNOR's REPORT, supra note 88, at 21.
Id. at 3.
NEB. REV. STAT.§ 79-1701 (1990).
Id. § 79-1701(2); id. § 79-201.
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that the Association would not lobby against compromise legislation, as senators said it had in previous years.
Whatever the legislators' motivation, one thing is clear: The state
viewed its regulatory scheme as less significant than these various
countervailing factors.
C.

Michigan

Political accommodations between the state and religious interests are the rule, not the exception. But political settlements are not
always reached. Today, Michigan stands alone in demanding
teacher certification in home study programs. 96 Despite vocal protests at the state capitol, 97 reform proposals are killed before they
make their way out of the education committee. 98 Perhaps a powerful teachers' union explains this resistance; 99 perhaps Michigan
lawmakers have deep-seated convictions concerning professional
certification. Whatever the explanation, Michigan exemplifies a
political culture generally hostile to religious liberty interests. Furthermore, Michigan courts have decisively rejected challenges to
teacher certification and other regulations by Fundamentalist Christian schools and home study programs.1oo
Michigan's steadfast commitment to its regulatory regime-reinforced by state court rulings-prompts images of state education officials wielding a big regulatory stick to keep recalcitrant parents and
schools in line. Not surprisingly, Michigan is more litigious than
other states, with state officials filing at least a dozen truancy or educational neglect petitions against home schoolers each year. 101 In
many ways, however, Michigan's pro-regulation image is more bark
than bite. Rather than several hundred home school parents finding
themselves in jail and their parental rights threatened, an uneasy
truce has emerged between religious interests and state officials.
Michigan's story is a tale of political compromise through generally lax law enforcement. Michigan home schoolers, knowing that
formal compliance with the teacher certification requirement would
be fatal to most home study programs, 102 read the law to suit their
purposes. According to Dr. Pat Montgomery, a leader in Michigan's
home education movement, "[n]owhere in the law does it say you
96. MicH. CoMP. LAws § 388.553 (1991).
97. Chris Parks, Home School Rally Held, UPI, Oct. 23, 1985, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, UPI File.
98. Telephone Interview with Maggie Thelen, Department Specialist, Office of Education and School Law, Michigan Department of Education (Oct. 17, 1991) [hereinafter
Thelen Interview].
99. See Parks, supra note 97. Strong organizational resistance also may help explain
mandatory teacher certification. For example, the National Education Association and
National Association of Elementary School Principals flatly oppose home study. See
Kohn, supra note 17, at 25.
100. See Sheridan Rd. Baptist Church v. Department of Educ., 396 N.W.2d 373
(Mich. 1986) (Christian schools); People v. Dejonge, 449 N.W.2d 899 (Mich. Ct. App.
1989) (home study).
101. See Michigan: Another Round of Wins and Losses, HoME ScH. CT. REP., May-June
1991, at 8; Michigan: Litigation Proliferates, HoME ScH. CT. REP., July-Aug. 1991, at 15.
102. See Dorman, supra note 6, at 756-58.
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have to have face to face contact with a certified teacher." 103 Montgomery therefore encourages Michigan home school families to "interpret the requirement to involve a certified teacher as to their own
needs. Some meet with a certified teacher every day, while others
merely talk to one on a phone once a year."I04
The state, for the most part, accepts this subterfuge. According
to one state official, once the local school officials are comfortable
that the children are being well taught and are receiving an education comparable to their public school counterparts, most local
school officials are satisfied and back off from rigid enforcement of
the statute. 105 Home education advocates likewise agree that it is
this process of compromise at the local level that has been the most
successful in convincing officials that home educators do a good job
of fulfilling all state interests in educating their children. 106 This
process of compromise or accommodation with local level officials is
difficult to document, however. Unlike the confrontational approach, which has ample record in court cases and other state publications, the accommodation approach relies on quiet confidence
building and is by its nature less publicized. Additionally, one interpretation of this process is that home educators are quietly convincing local school officials to disregard the state law.
Informal compromise is so effective here because, unlike other
states, Michigan provides for oversight of all children-whether they
attend a public, private, or home school-by district-level officials.107 Thus, where confrontation with state level agencies has at
best produced marginal success in protecting parental rights and
religious liberties, compromise and accommodation at the local
level seems to have been considerably more effective.
It is this atmosphere of local accommodation that has made home
education in Michigan a potentially realistic alternative for families
with strong religious motivations. Most home educators accept the
statutory status quo because, as the situation now stands, even
though there is considerable political tension at the state government level, the "wink" home educators receive from local officials
who are much more sensitive to local needs leaves them feeling relatively free to operate. 108 Indeed, home schoolers generally report
103. Telephone Interview with Dr. Pat Montgomery, Founder & Chief Administrator,
Clontara School (Oct. 21, 1991) [hereinafter Montgomery Interview].
104. Thelen Interview, supra note 98.
105. See id.
106. See Telephone Interview with David Kallman, Michigan Home School Attorney
(Oct. 17, 1991) [hereinafter Kallman Interview]; Montgomery Interview, supra note 103;
Thelen Interview, supra note 98.
107. See MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 388.551, .553 (1991).
108. See Kallman Interview, supra note 106.
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that they are not anxious to seek changes in the law. 109 They fear
that opening the issue up for too much discussion could have negative repercussions. 110
Right they are. Whereas North Carolina legislators embrace fundamentalist causes 111 and Nebraska legislators see deregulation as
the lesser of two evils, 112 powerful teacher unions in Michigan are
likely to preserve state-prescribed credentialism. Despite divergent
approaches, however, in all three instances a political solution
emerged. That two are open and the other clandestine, though significant, does not undercut the ultimate triumph of politics.
D.

Conclusion

The explicit and implicit compromises reached in North Carolina,
Nebraska, and Michigan are not unusual. On the question of state
regulation of Fundamentalist Christian schools, several states-including Alabama, Arizona, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and West Virginia-have joined Nebraska and North Carolina in exempting
religious schools from licensing, teacher certification, and curriculum requirements. 113 Other states-including Colorado and Iowahave reached administrative compromises. 114 Finally, some statesincluding Kentucky, Maine and Ohio-have failed to respond to
court decisions striking down state laws and procedures.11s
Changes in state laws governing home schooling are far more dramatic. In the past decade, thirty-two states have moderated or repealed home study regulations. 116 Sometimes, as in North Carolina,
these reforms are a response to court rulings; 117 sometimes, they
are a result of grass-roots political pressure. Whatever the explanation, religious interests typically prevail in the legislative arena.

Ill.

Cooperation, Not Capitulation

State concessions to Fundamentalist Christian educators and parents are inevitable. For the most part, concessions also make good
sense. At the same time, the state should not abandon those students who either attend religious schools or study at home with religious parents. Instead, the state must demand that religious
educators advance a limited number of public values.
109. Montgomery Interview, supra note 103.
llO. Id.
Ill. See supra notes 45-54, 66-70 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
l13. See Carper & Devins, supra note 4, at 215.
l14. See id.
115. See Devins, supra note 5, at 118. These states perceived that it was better to leave
the Christian day school issue dormant rather than prompt further controversy through
the promulgation of a new regulatory scheme.
l16. See supra note 6.
l17. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. Kansas and Arkansas, for example, enacted ·home school reform in response to court decisions. See Note, Home Education v. Compulsory Attendance Laws: Whose Kids are they Anyway'!, 24 WASHBURN LJ. 274,
292-96 (1985) (discussing Kansas reforms); House Adopts Home Education Bill, UPI, Feb.
28, 1985, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (discussing Arkansas).
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A.

Why Political Compromise Is Inevitable

The state bears a great cost when it engages in open confrontation with Fundamentalist Christian educators. The chief problem is
one of enforceable sanctions. 118 Under its parens patriae power,
the state can, on occasion, assume custody of a child when such action is in the child's best interest. 119 For example, the state may
exercise this power in the face of parental neglect. According to
Professor Sanford Katz, neglect statutes "in many respects, incorporate a community's view of parenthood. Essentially, they are pronouncements of unacceptable child-rearing practices." 120 While the
state most frequendy exercises its parens patriae power to prevent
physical abuse and neglect of children, 121 the state also has authority under this power to enforce truancy statutes. 122 Fundamentalist
Christian educators have been willing to push the state to this
extreme.
For many reasons, however, states do not want to reach this degree of confrontation. The closing of churches, the jailing of individuals for practicing their religion, and the displacement of
children demand a compelling justification. With Fundamentalist
Christian school and home study students outperforming their public school counterparts, 12 3 and with increasing public awareness of
problems with public school education, 124 the state cannot offer a
compelling justification for its enforcement actions. Moreover, with
public attention focused on public schools, it is politically counterproductive for the state to expend scarce educational resources on
118. See Kagan, supra note 20 (discussing analogous problem of fund termination
sanction as being too severe to be effectively utilized); supra notes 74-93 and accompanying text (discussing Nebraska's experience in trying to enforce sanctions against Christian educators).
119. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604 (1979) (stating that if minimal due
process standards are met, parents can commit their child to a state mental hospital if it
is in his or her "best interests").
120. SANFORD N. KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAIL 57 (1971).
121. See, e.g., Hernandez v. State, 530 P.2d 389 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) (terminating
parental rights upon a finding of abuse); In re S.G., 581 A.2d 771, 781 (D.C. 1990)
(awarding custody to maternal grandmother upon finding sexual abuse by stepfather
and a failure of the mother to stop the abuse).
122. See, e.g., In re James D., 741 P.2d 161, 166-67 (Cal. 1987) (upholding truancy
statute as constitutionally justified by the legitimate governmental interest in compulsory education), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988); State v. Buckner, 472 So. 2d 1228,
1229-30 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (holding truancy statute to not be unconstitutionally
vague).
123. On the virtues of private schools, see joHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MoE, PoLITICs,
MARKETS, AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 67 (1990); jAMES S. CoLEMAN ET AL., HIGH SCHOOL
ACHIEVEMENT: PUBUC, CATHOLIC, AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS COMPARED (1982); see also supra
note 17.
124. On problems in public education, see CHESTER E. FINN, JR., WE MusT TAKE
CHARGE: OuR ScHOOLS AND OuR FUTURE (1991); NAT'L CoMM'N ON ExcELLENCE IN EDuCATION, A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE OF EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983); Diane
Ravitch, U.S. Schools: The Bad News is Right, WASH. PosT, Nov. 17, 1991, at C7.
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the enforcement of controversial private school regulations. 125
Deregulation of religious education-or nonenforcement of regulations-seems a sensible political solution. Confrontations between the state and Fundamentalist Christian educators are
politically divisive, are the focus of national attention, and, if carried
to their logical extreme, ultimately may force the state to jail parents
and ministers and seek custody of children. Additionally, if the state
feels compelled to reverse its previous policies, it may appear weak,
and its interest in education will be subject to challenge. The best
political course is to strike a balance favoring religious liberty and
parental rights. Massive legislative reform of both home instruction
and church-affiliated schools bears this out.
B.

Why Cooperation Is Sound Educational Policy

Noncooperation has failed; therefore, cooperation must be better.
Put another way: state educational officials are likely to exert more
influence by favoring cooperative strategies over adversarial ones.
The National Association of State Boards of Education, for example,
has suggested that "[p]ublic educators cannot avoid the issue of
home schooling. . . . When public educators work cooperatively
with home schooling parents they can enhance understanding and
strengthen community ties." 126 Specifically, cooperation may make
parents more willing to submit to state evaluation, thereby enabling
the state to help parents become better teachers. 127 As former
United States Department of Education official Patricia Lines observed, states should "work to build bridges . . . . Given a more
favorable legal and political environment, it becomes possible to develop positive public/private educational efforts."I2s
Cooperation is also necessary to protect children. Home school
and Fundamentalist Christian day school students might experience
frequent disruptions in their education if the state vigorously enforced its regulatory scheme. In Nebraska, for example, children
attending the Faith Christian School had to contend with both being
taught in another state and not being taught at all. 129 Obviously,
this type of sporadic education harms children. Considering that
the primary aim of compulsory schooling is the education of youth,
the state should focus its attention on those children whose lives are
most affected by its actions.
Cooperation is not simply a way to stave off the costs of enforcement. It makes sense because religious educators are not the enemy; instead, they are dedicated parents trying to do right by their
125. Telephone Interview with Virginia Roach, Project Director, National Association of State Boards of Education (Nov. 15, 1991) [hereinafter Roach Interview].
126. NATIONAL Ass'N OF STATE Bos. OF EDUC., HOME SCHOOLING, july 1988, at 2
(copy on file with Author).
127. Virginia Roach, Home Schooling in Times of Educational Rifonn, Eouc. DIG., Feb.
1989, at 58, 61.
128. Patricia M. Lines, An Overview of Home Instruction, 1987 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 510,
516.
129. See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
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children. Parents do not teach their children at home or send them
to religious schools because they are unconcerned. To the contrary,
religious schools and home study programs exemplify the type of
parent-child-school relationship that should be encouraged by the
state. It should come as no surprise that children in these schools
outperform their public school counterparts on nationally recognized achievement tests.Iao
State cooperation, finally, makes sense because it respects the
rights of dissenting families to avoid state-prescribed socialization
without calling into question the right of school authorities to inculcate community-selected values in public schools. 181 Correlatively,
there is a legitimate parental interest in "living one's life through
one's children, [which] might be called the parent's right to exercise
his religion through the child, and to extend through the child ideas,
language, and customs which the parent believes to be important." 182 Cooperation then is not simply the lesser of two evils. Pluralism, religious liberty, and educational achievement all support
cooperative strategies.
C.

The Limits of Cooperation

Cooperation does not mean abdication. Some states, however,
have elected to avoid conflicts with dissenting religious parents and
educators by scrapping all meaningful regulations. In these states,
students need not demonstrate proficiency in core subject areas. Instead, they need only take a standardized achievement test. 183 But
to mandate test-taking without mandating a minimum passing score
is to substitute the state's critical interest in the education of its
youth with a symbolic fig leaf.
This abdication of responsibility is as dangerous as it is irresponsible. The challenge for lawmakers and regulators, as recognized by
the National Association of State Boards of Education, is "to meet
their obligations to assure all children receive a quality education
130. See CoLEMAN ET AL., supra note 123, at 124-31, 176 (finding that private school
students outperform public school students on standardized achievement tests); see also
supra note 17.
131. See Michael A. Rebell, Values Inculcation and the Schools: The Need for a New Pierce
Compromise, in PUBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE SCHOOLS 37-38, 52-53 (Neal Devins ed., 1989)
(describing the dilemma and proposing a voucher scheme based on cooperation to solve
it).
132. John H. Garvey, Child, Parent, State, and the Due Process Clause, 51 S. CAL. L. REv.
. 769, 806 (1978).
133. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 17:236.l(D) (West Supp. 1991); supra notes 46-50, 5859, and accompanying text (discussing North Carolina); see also Frances F. Marcus, As
Busing Begins in Schools, Louisiana Clears Way for Teaching in Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25,
1981, at Al4 (describing the lax system in Louisiana and the possible harm to students).
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while considering the relative rights of parents to educate their children."134 This challenge cannot be ignored. At the most practical
level, many students participating in home study programs and attending Fundamentalist Christian schools will later be "absorbed"
into public school systems. 135 More significant, the state's interest
in the well-being of its children as well as its own well-being demands that these children not be discounted.
Education is a public good of fundamental importance. "It is the
very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for
later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to
his environment." 136 Education, under this formulation, is too important to allow private schools to be freed from public school
concerns.
But what are these concerns? Clearly, private schools can be required to offer competent instruction in reading, writing, and arithmetic. Private schools also can be made to conform to the Brown
mandate of racially nondiscriminatory admissions. 137 These conclusions, however, tell us very little. The conflict between the fundamentalists and the regulators is not about the need for competent
instruction; instead, the conflict concerns the definition of
l
competency.
This problem is intractable, and I offer no magical solution. It is
my opinion, however, that private schools should never be held
more accountable for attaining the goals of compulsory education
than are public schools. In short, if students in Fundamentalist
Christian academies or home study programs test as well as their
public school counterparts, the state cannot demand that such
schools significantly change their methods of instruction. At the
same time, the state can demand that teachers have at least a high
school education (or pass an equivalency test}, that students are regularly tested, and that religious educators be placed under increased
scrutiny when their students are not making adequate progress. Iss
From the standpoint of private and home schools, this formulation seems satisfactory, at least at present. Unless there is a considerable change in the educational outcomes of public school
students, private schools and home study programs should be able
to match these outcomes without altering their preferred methodology.139 Furthermore, compliance with simple nondiscrimination
134. NATIONAL Ass'N OF STATE Bos. OF Eouc., supra note 126, at I.
135. Id. at 2; Roach Interview, supra note 125.
136. Brown v. Board ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
137. This is what the Supreme Court held in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160
(1976), a case involving a nons ector commercial private school. Bob Jones University v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), suggests that Runyon applies to religious schools.
138. The National Association of State Boards of Education has suggested-but not
formally endorsed-these and other regulatory initiatives. See NATIONAL Ass'N OF STATE
Bos. OF Eouc., supra note 126, at 9-10.
139. There is good reason to think that the educational outcomes of private schools
will be higher than those of public schools. John Chubb and Terry Moe, for example,
argue that private schools-unlike public schools-operate within a "market setting
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places few burdens on private schools-even those religious schools
that believe in the separation of the races. Under current standards,
the only absolute limitation on such a school is the requirement of
racially nondiscriminatory admissions. 140
Were public school standards to change, however, private and
home schools might be asked to bear a greater burden. This prospect is troublesome, for it may interfere with parental prerogatives
in education. Were public schools to truly change for the better,
however, it is nonetheless appropriate that expectations of private
and home schools also rise. In other words, a ceiling on appropriate
state demands must always be relativistic. We cannot lose sight of
the fact that what it takes to educate youth for citizenship must always be our ceiling and our floor.

IV.

Conclusion

The devolution of state governance over religious education
should inform both individual rights interests and state officials.
With Smith and other Rehnquist Court rulings increasingly speaking
of the need to defer to govemment, 141 special intetests are beginning to tum away from the courts and towards elected govemment.142 "What may be new," as Professor Paul Weber observed,
"is the idea that this comes to be seen as a political necessity, a
'price' of having one's interests protected, of being responsible citizens in a democracy." 143
This renaissance of populist reform undoubtedly makes a lot of
sense. But populist reform-at least with respect to religious liberty
issues-has always made a lot of sense. Before Smith, the judiciary's
free exercise record was at best mixed. 144 Thus, religious liberty
[where] ... there are strong forces at work-arising from the technical, administrative,
and consumer-satisfaction requirements of organizational success-that promote school
autonomy." CHUBB & MoE, supra note 123, at 37. For a critique of Chubb and Moe, see
James S. Liebman, Voice, Not Choice, 101 YALE LJ. 259 (1991).
140. See Bob jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 575; Runyon, 427 U.S. at 178-79.
141. Smith, for example, is not the only decision to uphold "a neutral law of general
applicability" irrespective of its impact on constitutionally protected freedoms. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,879 (1990). In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., the Rehnquist Court likewise upheld "a law of general applicability" irrespective of its impact on
the First Amendment freedom of the press. 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2518 (1991).
142. The National Abortion Rights Action League, for example, recently informed its
membership that "[c]learly Congress is our Court of Last Resort. All hope of protecting
our constitutional right to choose depends upon our elected representatives . . . ."
NARAL SuPREME CoURT ALERT (June 27, 1991) (quoted in Louis FISHER & NEAL
DEVINS, PoLmCAL DYNAMICS oF CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw (1992)).
143. Paul J. Weber, Religious Accountability: Maximalist Positions, (unpublished
manuscript, on file with The George Washington Law Review)(1992).
144. Compare Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause prohibited the state from forcing Amish children to attend school); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that a regulation denying unemployment benefits to an individual who refused to work on Saturdays on religious grounds violated the
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interests generally have fared at least as well before elected officials
than appointedjudges. Ironically, Smith may be a boon to religious
liberty. By prompting religious liberty interests to focus reform efforts before the elected government, the reform efforts may prove
more successful. The proven success of religious educators in accomplis4,ing their objectives through politics, not the courts, bears
this out.
State officials can also learn from their experiences with religious
educators. The state cannot be satisfied with court victories, populist religious reformers will place great pressure on government to
reform burdensome legislation and regulation. Rather than engage
in often counterproductive adversarial battles, the state should engage in constructive constitutional dialogues with religious liberty
interests. These dialogues should seek compromise solutions that
preserve legitimate state interests without unduly burdening religious liberty. At the same time, states must be careful not to concede necessary interests simply to avoid unpleasant conflicts, as
some states unfortunately did in an effort to appease Fundamentalist Christian educators. 14 5
Whether religious interests and state officials will increasingly
forge cooperative arrangements remains to be seen. Both sides
should; constructive cooperation makes better policy than adversarial litigation. That is the lesson of the battle between the state
and Fundamentalist Christian educators.

Free Exercise Clause); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (holding that the government may not compel affirmation of religious belief) with Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693
(1986) (holding that government may make internal use of an individual's social security
number over a religion-based claim); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986)
(holding that an Orthodox jew may not wear a yarmulke while on military duty); United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (holding that religious belief prohibiting participation
in government did not require exemption from social security tax); Gillette v. United
States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (holding that the Selective Service System did not violate the
Free Exercise Clause by conscripting individuals religiously opposed to war); Braunfeld
v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (holding that the burden on Orthodox jews to comply
with a law prohibiting conducting business on Sunday was indirect). For commentary
on the judiciary's record, see Ira C. Lupu, When Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the
Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REv. 933 (1989) (describing courts' reluctance to
find that government practices actually burden religious exercise); Paul Marcus, The Forum of Conscience: Applying Standards Under the Free Exercise Clause, 1973 DuKE LJ. 121 7
(tracing the free exercise doctrine standard through the 1972 case of Wisconsin v. Yoder
and pointing out the need for further refinement of the balancing test established by the
Supreme Court).
145. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.

840

(VOL.

60:818

